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British and Indian Activities in Spanish West
Florida During the War of 1812
by FRANK L. OWSLEY , J R.
BRITAIN lost control of Florida in 1783 to Spain, many
English merchants and public officials, especially the governors of Jamaica and New Providence, did not consider the loss
of Florida as permanent. They continued an extensive legal and
illegal trade with the Indians in Florida and the southern United
States. The mouth of the Apalachicola River and the area around
it comprised one of the main seats of this commerce, especially
the illegal part. In line with their objectives of regaining control
of Florida, these various British officials and merchants sent such
filibusterers as William Augustus Bowles, who plotted to create
an independent Indian state or possibly to reannex the area to
Britain. 1 In an effort to halt the illegal trade and to prevent seizure of the area, the Spanish constructed a fort at Apalachee. The
forces of Spain, however, were spread far too thin to man the
post properly, and there is little evidence that the existence of
the fort had much effect on the trade. 2
This rivalry between Britain and Spain in Florida made it
difficult for the two countries to cooperate against the United
States, which, by 1812, had become the greatest menace to Florida. By this time both Britain and Spain had reason to desire a
weaker United States as part of their efforts to protect themselves.
Britain was, of course, at war with the United States, but Spain
had perhaps more actual grievances against the Americans than
did the British.
Since Spain was first actively engaged in opposing the United
States, it is necessary to start with an examination of the Spanish
position. The North American forces had in 1810 annexed Baton
Rouge by a successful revolution and filibustering expedition. On
April 14, 1812, the United States Congress arrogantly claimed
HEN

1 . J . L e i t c h W r i g h t , J r . , “British Designs on the Old Southwest:
Foreign Intrigue on the Florida Frontier, 1783-1803,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XLIV (April 1966), 265-84.
2. Baron de Carondelet to Luis de las Casas, May 23, 1793, Archivo
General de Indias, Seville, Spain, Papeles Procedentes de Cuba, legajo
1447. Cited hereafter as AGI, Cuba.
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Mobile and West Florida as far as the Perdido River, a year in
advance of the actual seizure of Fort Charlotte at Mobile by
American forces. 3 They were also directly or indirectly engaged
in filibustering expeditions both in East Florida and in Spanish
Texas. 4
Faced with numerous intrusions, the Spanish authorities of
West Florida were understandably anxious to check or damage
the United States. As a result of the Napoleonic wars, Spain was
in a state of chaos, and there was unrest throughout most of the
Spanish empire. The situation made it impossible to send a strong
force into West Florida, or even adequately to supply the small
force of 400 or 500 soldiers stationed there. 5
Spain had supported the Creek and Seminole Indians as a
barrier to United States expansion, gaining influence among the
Indians by means of trade and the distribution of gifts. SpanishIndian policy usually had been to keep the Indians strong and at
peace with the United States because a fight would probably have
led to their destruction. Spain wanted to maintain the Indians as
a force in being. 6
1812 and 1813 were critical times in the Gulf coast area
and in Florida for both Spain and Britain. The weakened Spanish,
attacked on all sides, seemed certain to lose all of Florida bit by
bit. The British were interested in the Gulf coast as a possible
Hubert Bruce Fuller, The Purchase of Florida, Its History and Diplomacy (Cleveland, 1906), 185-86, 199. See also facsimile edition
with introduction by Weymouth T. Jordan (Gainesville, 1964).
James Wilkinson to the officer in command of the Spanish garrison
in the town of Mobile, Mississippi Territory, April 12, 1813; and
David Holms to Mauricio de Zuniga, April 30, 1813, AGI, Cuba,
legajo 1794.
Jose L. Franco, Politica Continental Americana De Espana En Cuba
1812-1830 (Habana, 1947), 39-46.
I. J. Cox believed that the West Florida garrison, which for the most
part was located at Pensacola, numbered only 288 men, much smaller
than 400 or 500 soldiers. However, several reports indicated that
there were at least 400 men in the town or at the Barrancas fort.
Cox probably failed to count the troops of Colonel Jose DeSoto
which had been sent from Cuba after the fall of Mobile. Report of
the Louisiana regiment, May 1813, and Don Mattio Gonzales
Manrique to Juan Ruiz Apodaca, May 15, 1813, AGI, Cuba, legajo
1794; A. Campbell to Homer V. Milton, May [June ?] 7, 1814, enclosure in Thomas Pinckney to the secretary of war, July 2, 1814,
Letters to the Secretary of War, Record Group 107, National Archives.
Frances Kathryn Harrison, “T h e I n d i a n s a s a M e a n s o f S p a n i s h
Defense of West Florida, 1783-1795” (unpublished master’s thesis,
University of Alabama, 1950), passim.
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area from which to attack the Americans. When Tecumseh
aroused the Creek and Seminole Indians to war with the United
States, the Indians immediately appealed to the British and Spanish for help. 7 This situation provided the British with the opportunity they needed to launch either a diversion or a major attack
on the United States. Although the British officials had been observing the activities of the southern Indians, the London government had made no advance preparations to help them, and it was
some time before supplies could be sent. 8
The Spanish, though critically short of supplies themselves,
believed that the United States was preparing to annex all of
Florida and that the Indians were potentially their best allies.
The Spanish were also concerned with the possibility that the
Indians might turn their hostility against Florida in the event
that they were refused help. With this in mind, Governor Don
Mattio Gonzales Manrique of Spanish Florida provided the Creeks
with all the munitions he could spare. 9 Despite the usual Spanish
policy of avoiding a confrontation with the United States, Manrique’s superior, the Captain General of Cuba, Juan Ruiz Apodaca, approved arming the Indians. The subsequent destruction of
Fort Mims by the Creek Indians and the massacre of a large number of Americans caused some Spanish officials alarm because
they feared that Pensacola would be captured in retaliation. 10
Although he was concerned with the danger to Pensacola,
Apodaca apparently believed that the American attack would come
in any event and that the only proper course was to prepare as
good a defense as possible. In fact, some months before, Apodaca
had dispatched Colonel Jose DeSoto and part of his regiment from
Havana to reinforce Pensacola, and he continued to encourage
7.

Franco, Politica Continental Americana, 39-46; Merritt B. Pound,
Benjamin Hawkins-Indian Agent (Athens, 1951), 211-20.
8. Alexander Durant et al to his Excellency the Governor of Providence,
September 11, 1813, and Charles Cameron to Earl Bathurst, October
28, 1813, in Public Record Office; Colonial Office 23/60. Cited hereafter as PRO:CO. Bathurst to Cameron, January 21, 1814, PRO:
CO 24/17.
9. John Innerarity to James Innerarity, July 27, 1813, quoted in Elizabeth H. West, “A Prelude to the Creek War of 1813-1814,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, XVIII (April 1940), 249-60; Apodaca to the
minister of war, October 1, 1813, AGI, Cuba, legajo 1856.
10. Apodaca to the minister of war, August 6, 1813, AGI, Cuba, legajo
1856; Luis de Oris to Pedro Labrador, October 8, 1813, Archivo
Historico Nacional, Madrid, Spain, Estado legajo 5639.
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the governor of West Florida to arm the Indians. 11 An examination of the correspondence between Manrique and Apodaca in
1813 and early 1814, indicates that this show of force in Florida
was a departure from the usual policy of avoiding all conflicts.
However, except for supporting the Indians, an operation he considered necessary, Apodaca acted so that Spain would be able to
obtain a retrocession of all her lost territory, through good
diplomacy. 12
Although the Spanish were the first to furnish supplies to the
Creek Indians who were fighting the United States, initial British
aid came several months later. The British were keenly interested
in the situation regarding the Indians. Governor Charles Cameron
of New Providence, who apparently had some knowledge of the
hostile intent of the Creeks, sent a British ship to Pensacola in
September 1813, to determine the status of the southern Indians.
The captain, Edward Handfield, met a delegation of Creeks and
Seminoles there and received letters from them asking for help in
their war with the United States. The Indians appealed to the
British for arms and troops to train and lead them, and they
asked that the aid be sent to their base of operation at Apalachicola. 13 Governor Cameron forwarded the letters from the Indians
to Earl Bathurst, secretary of state for war, and a short time
later he sent Bathurst a report from an unidentified person who
was supposed to have a good knowledge of the Gulf coast Indians. This report, which was strongly endorsed by Cameron,
proposed to arm the Creek and Seminole Indians and to furnish a force of British officers to lead them. It was believed
that eventually most of the southern Indians would join the
British, giving them a force of around 15,000 warriors. Properly supplied, these Indians were expected to divert at least that
many American troops from Canada or from other duties. The
proposal suggested that the Spanish, in all probability, would
not object to the British supporting the Florida Indians or to their
11. Apodaca to the minister of war, June 16, August 6, 1813, AGI,
Cuba, legajo 1856; Manrique to Apodaca, June 13, 1813, AGI,
Cuba, legajo 1794.
12. Franco, Politica Continental Americana, 21-23; Apodaca to Manrique, December 10, 1813, and Apodaca to the minister of war,
June 6, 1814, AGI, Cuba, legajo 1856.
13. Alexander Durant et al to the governor of Providence, September 11,
1813, and Cameron to Bathurst, October 28, 1813, PRO:CO 23/60.
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using Pensacola as an anchorage from which they could maintain
a tight blockade of the Mississippi. 14 The plans were laid out in
detail. Bathurst’s answer was enthusiastic, and he ordered Cameron to give all support possible to the Indians. He also directed
British naval forces in North America to aid the Indians.
Contrary to the belief expressed in some accounts that the
actions of Tecumseh and some Canadian officials were already
fully known in England, this letter from Bathurst indicates that
Cameron’s report was the first knowledge that London had on
the activities of the southern Indians. 15 Unfortunately, the slowness of communications caused a long delay in British response
to the Indian request of September 11, 1813. It was not until
April 1814, seven months later, that Admiral Alexander Cochrane ordered Captain Hugh Pigot of HMS Orpheus to Apalachicola. Before sailing, Pigot held conferences with Cameron and with
several merchants that he had recommended to learn what they
knew about the Gulf. These men suggested an attack on New Orleans and Mobile since the garrisons there were extremely weak
and the capture of the cities was expected to be an easy matter. 16
Upon his arrival on May 10, Pigot discovered that the most
war-like element of the Creeks had suffered a series of reverses
in engagements with the Americans and had sustained a shattering defeat at Horseshoe Bend. About 900 of the most hostile
surviving Creeks had taken refuge around Pensacola, where they
1 7
The Indians at Apalachicola
were starving and without arms.
were also so short of food that it was impossible for them to concentrate a large force there unless the British shipped in provisions. 18 Before leaving Apalachicola, Pigot appointed George
Woodbine, a former Indian trader, as British agent to the Creeks.
After a few weeks, Woodbine removed his headquarters to Pensacola.
14. Cameron to Bathurst, November 30, 1813, and enclosures, PRO:CO
23/60.
15. Bathurst to Cameron, January 21, 1814, PRO:CO 24/17.
16. Hugh Pigot to Alexander Cochrane, June 8, 1814, in Public Record
Office: Admiralty 1/506. Cited hereafter as PRO: Adm. Pigot to
Cochrane, April 13, 1814, ms. 2328, Cochrane Papers, National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh, Scotland.
17. Pigot to George Woodbine, May 10, 1814, and Edward Nicolls to
Apodaca, November 9, 1814, ms. 2328, Cochrane Papers; Juan Ventura
Morales to Alexandeo Ramirez, November 3, 1817, Boletin del Archivo Nacional, XII (January-February 1914), 14-15.
18. Woodbine to Pigot, May 25, 1814, ms. 2328, Cochrane Papers.
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In his report to Admiral Cochrane, Pigot, who had been
thoroughly briefed and had been given guides and maps by Governor Cameron at New Providence, enthusiastically repeated the
governor’s ideas as if they were his own. 19 Admiral Cochrane was
in complete agreement, and as a direct result of the report and
much communication with Cameron, he recommended a plan of
attack against the southern parts of the United States. Cochrane’s
scheme, like Cameron’s, called for the full use of the Indians to
secure all the back country; it also suggested that Mobile and New
Orleans could be secured with 2,000 or 3,000 British troops to
reinforce the Indians. 20
In London, the British home government was already considering a plan to make a massive attack on the Gulf coast area.
It was assumed that the capture of New Orleans would neutralize
the states of Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee, a turn of events
which would be disastrous to the American war effort. 21 Admiral
Sir John Borlase Warren, Cochrane’s predecessor, proposed in
November 1812, to First Lord of the Admiralty Viscount Melville,
that a Gulf coast offensive be undertaken. His suggestion was
very similar to the plans of Cameron and Cochrane except that it
envisioned a much larger operation. Warren, like Cochrane, probably was influenced by Governor Cameron. His idea for an expedition called for a major offensive rather than simply a diversion
for the Canadian attack which was being readied by Britain. By
the spring of 1814, with preparations for the Canadian offensive
in the final stages, the London government started serious planning for a massive Gulf coast campaign to be commanded by
Lord Rowland Hill. Perhaps because of war weariness or fear that
the expedition would be too costly, it was later decided to abandon
the project. 22 However, when Cochrane’s proposal arrived, calling
for the southern offensive to be conducted with a much smaller
Pigot to Cochrane, April 13, 1814, ms. 2328, Cochrane Papers;
Pigot to Cochrane, June 8, 1814, PRO:Adm 1/506.
20. Cochrane to John Wilson Crocker, June 20, 1814, in Public Record
Office: War Office 1/142. Cited hereafter as PRO:WO. Cameron to
Cochrane, August 2, 1814, ms. 2328, Cochrane Papers.
21. Harry L. Coles, The War of 1812 (Chicago, 1965), 202-21; John
K. Mahon, “British Command Decisions Relative to the Battle of New
Orleans,” Louisiana History, VII (Winter 1965), 53-61.
22. J o h n K . M a h o n , “British Strategy and Southern Indians: War of
1812,” Florida Historical Quarterly, XLIV (April 1966), 285.
19.
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force, the government accepted his plan with enthusiasm. 23 After
all, Cochrane’s plan came well recommended; from all appearances, Cameron, Pigot, and Admiral Warren had all independently suggested approximately the same scheme.
This proposed campaign, an outgrowth of Cameron’s recommendation, was an elaborate example of British peripheral warfare
and the use of irregular troops. As the first part of the operation,
Cochrane sent Major Edward Nicolls with a force of Royal marines to assume command of the British in West Florida and to
reinforce Woodbine at Pensacola. They were expected to raise
a large force of Indians to attack the Georgia frontier and the
settlements along the Alabama River. As a part of his mission,
Nicolls was ordered to recruit runaway slaves and to form them
into regiments to fight their former masters, a situation expected
to cause panic and terror throughout the South. In addition to his
plan to arm Negroes and Indians, Cochrane asked for a force of
around 2,000 to 3,000 men for an attack against either Mobile or
New Orleans. His primary plan was to move against Mobile and
then, using flat boats mounted with naval guns, to push up the
Alabama River destroying the various wooden forts that had been
built by the United States. After the enemy’s garrisons were
destroyed, Cochrane expected the army to advance overland to
Baton Rouge, cutting the Mississippi at that point. 24 Cochrane
also planned to have Admiral George Cockburn, with a force of
marines, raid the Georgia and South Carolina coasts. Cockburn
was to raise a force of Negroes from among runaway slaves also.
The Cockburn raids were expected to prevent Georgia and North
and South Carolina from sending large reinforcements either to
the Gulf coast or Canada. Similar raids were to be conducted in
the Chesapeake Bay area, in the belief that fear of raids on Washington and Baltimore would keep large forces on duty there and
away from the action in other parts of the country. 25
Another segment of the plan called for the recruitment of
Jean Lafitte and his force of Baratarians, supposed to number some
800 men. It was presumed that Lafitte’s force would readily
join the British cause since they had been badly treated by the
23. Crocker to Cochrane, August 10, 1814, PRO:WO 6/2.
24. Cochrane to Crocker, June 20, 1814, PRO:WO 1/142.
25. Expedition against New Orleans (undated memorandum), PRO:
WO 1/142; Cochrane to Bathurst, September 2, 1814, PRO:WO
1/141.
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Americans. Thus it came as a surprise when Lafitte rejected the
British offer; the English had failed to realize that the Baratarians
would lose a large part of their revenue if they became their allies
since they would have been compelled to stop raiding Spanish
commerce. 26
Even without Baratarian support, the British formulated their
basic plan of attack on the Gulf coast. The main objective was
always New Orleans, but the point of attack was switched at the
last minute from Mobile to New Orleans itself. 27 The campaign
began when Woodbine and Nicolls were dispatched to West Florida. Shortly after their arrival, Spanish Governor Manrique, believing that an American attack was imminent, requested British help
in the defense of Pensacola. Almost as soon as Nicolls arrived on
August 14, 1814, he assumed virtual command of the town and
proceeded to recruit nearly all the local slaves for his Negro regiment. He drilled the Negroes and Indians in the town and established a strict passport system to control all travel. These activities
enraged the local citizens who were often abused by Nicolls’
troops, but as long as the British seemed able to defend Pensacola
against the Americans, Manrique was perfectly willing to aid
them and to allow them a free hand. 28 When the overconfident
Nicolls attacked Mobile Point with a naval squadron supported
by only 252 Indians and marines, he lost the frigate Hermes and
was defeated. This turn of events unquestionably caused Manrique
to have grave doubts concerning British ability to defend Pensacola. 29
Nicolls’ decision to consider the John Forbes Company, a
trading agency owned by British citizens, as enemies and traitors
and his efforts to abduct numbers of their slaves proved to be a
serious blow to cooperation between Britain and Spain in Florida.
26. Jane Lucas de Grummond, The Baratarians and the Battle of New
Orleans (Baton Rouge, 1961), 37-48.
27. Bathurst to General Ross, September 6, 1814, PRO:WO 6/2; Mahon,
“British Command Decisions,” 69.
2 8 . J o h n I n n e r a r i t y , “Narrative of the Operation of the British in the
Floridas,” ms. dated 1815, Heloise H. Cruzat Papers, Florida Historical Society Library, University of South Florida, Tampa (transcript in
P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History, Gainesville, Florida); Nicolls
to Cochrane, Report August [12-] November 17, 1813, ms. 2328,
Cochrane Papers.
29. Nicolls to Cochran, November 17, 1814, ms. 2328. Cochran papers; Nicolls to Lord Melville, May 5, 1817, PRO/WO 1/144;
Apodaca to the minister of war, October 9, 1814, AGI, Cuba, legajo
1856.
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The company was very influential among the Creeks and Seminoles, and it was probably the largest producer of revenue for the
30
Nicolls looked upon the company’s
Spanish in West Florida.
partners, James and John Innerarity, as traitors since they had
tried to prevent a Creek Indian war by refusing to sell the Indians
guns and ammunition. Nicolls also correctly believed that they
were spying for the Americans. 31
The British forces at Pensacola dealt harshly not only with
the Forbes Company but also with Spanish citizens and even
government officials. When Manrique refused to make adequate
preparations for the defense of the town, James Gordon, British
naval commander, threatened to level the city with gunfire. 32 He
did not carry out his threat, but he did blow up the Barrancas and
move the fort’s 200-man Spanish garrison to Apalachicola as
virtual prisoners. Some of these men, mostly Negro troops from
Cuba, were held captive and were used at Apalachicola as a work
33
This was done in spite of nuforce until the end of the war.
merous appeals by Spanish officials for their release. 34
Most Spanish officials blamed the damage to Pensacola and
the destruction of the Barrancas on Governor Manrique, who, on
his own authority, had asked the British to assist in the town’s
defense. Although Captain General Apodaca had encouraged
Manrique to assist the Indians, he had had serious doubts about
30. Marie Taylor Greenslade, “John Innerarity, 1783-1854,” Florida
Historical Quarterly, IX (October 1930), 90-95; Adam Gordon to
James Innerarity, February 17, 1817, Forbes Papers, Mobile Public
Library, Mobile, Alabama.
31. In order to protect their property, the Inneraritys obtained Spanish
citizenship in October 1812. By doing so they did not lose their
British citizenship since they had permission from the British government “to reside, and uniformly receive the necessary facilities from
His Majesty’s government, to enable them to carry on under any flag
best suited for the purpose.” James L. Potts to Bathurst, November 22,
1815, PRO:WO 1/143; certificate of citizenship recorded by Don
Joseph E. Caro, keeper of the Public Spanish Archives of West Florida, October 6, 1812, Greenslade Papers, Florida Historical Society
Library (transcript in P. K. Yonge Library of Florida History); Nicolls
to Cochrane, March 1, 1816, PRO:WO 1/144; John Innerarity to
James Innerarity, June 9, 1814, and James Innerarity to John McKee,
June 16, 1814, in miscellaneous files of secretary of war, Letters of
the Secretary of War.
32. John Innerarity to James Innerarity, November 7, 1814, “Letters of
John Innerarity,” Florida Historical Quarterly, IX (January 1931),
127-30; Vicente de Ordozgoitti to Apodaca, September 21, 1814,
AGI, Cuba, legajo 1856.
33. Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, PRO: Adm 1/505.
34. Manrique to Cochrane, January 25, 1815, Cruzat Papers.
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letting the English defend Pensacola. 35 Considering the losses
of property and harsh treatment by the British, the captain general’s fears were well founded. After the British evacuated Pensacola, the Spanish governors were ordered to refuse permission for
any foreign troops to land in Florida. 36
The treatment of the Spanish by the Americans under
Andrew Jackson, who drove the British out of Pensacola, was in
great contrast to that of the English. The Spanish were pleased
with the good behavior of the Americans, and Manrique from
this time on followed a policy of friendship toward them. Spanish
protests after the capture of Pensacola were relatively mild. 37
The Pensacola and Mobile operations of Nicolls and his Indians
gained nothing for the British except the Spanish enmity. Moreover, thousands of dollars in damage claims had to be paid by the
British government, including $20,000 to the Forbes company. 38
Through good intelligence information Jackson was aware of
the British plan to attack New Orleans, and he raised an army
to repel the onslaught. Because of this action and major British
tactical errors, the New Orleans attack was a complete failure.
Other aspects, however, of the Gulf coast campaign were fairly
successful, and the various British diversions caused some changes
in the alignment of American forces. While Nicolls and his Indians did not make any significant raids on the Georgia frontier,
the fact that he was located at Apalachicola caused 2,500 Georgia
militia and friendly Indians to be diverted from other activities. 39
Also, Admiral Cockburn’s raids, although later in getting started
than had been anticipated, succeeded in diverting a substantially
large force to the Atlantic coast. 40
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.
40.

Gordon to Cochrane, November 18, 1814, PRO:Adm 1/505; Nicolls
to Cochrane, August 4, 1814, ms. 2328, Cochrane Papers; Apodaca
to the minister of war, October 9, 1814, AGI, Cuba, legajo 1856.
Sebastian Kindelan to Don Fernando de la Puente, January 11,
1815, American State Papers, Foreign Affairs, 38 vols. (Washington,
1832-1861), IV, 488.
Manrique to Andrew Jackson, December 1, 1814, Jackson Papers,
Library of Congress; Luis de Onis to James Monroe, December 10,
1814, Notes from the Spanish legation, Record Group 59, National
Archives.
John Innerarity to James Innerarity, May 10, 1815, and Jose Urcerllo
to Manrique, January 23, 1815, Forbes Papers.
Benjamin Hawkins to James Winchester, December 27, 1814, Winchester Papers, Tennessee Historical Society, Nashville, Tennessee;
Augusta Chronicle, December 30, 1814.
John Floyd to Mary H. Floyd, December 28, 1814, in John Floyd
letters to his daughter, Georgia Department of Archives and History,
Atlanta, Georgia.
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After their repulse at New Orleans in early 1815, the British
turned again on Mobile where they captured Fort Bowyer at
Mobile Point, and they were preparing to attack the city when
news of the war’s end arrived. In deciding to attack Mobile,
Cochrane had intended to revert to the original plan: to capture
the town and attack New Orleans from the rear by way of Baton
Rouge. He expected to use his Indians to screen the back country. 41 After seizing the defenses of Mobile Point, the British
would have had little difficulty in capturing Mobile with the
support of naval gunfire. If they had not wished to attack the
city itself, they could have instituted a blockade and the American
army would either have had to surrender or evacuate since its
supplies were nearly exhausted. Mobile and Pensacola had been
supplied mainly with food from New Orleans; these goods had
been brought through the Mississippi Sound, which the British
did not block until just before the New Orleans attack. Once the
Sound was blocked, however, Mobile almost immediately ran out
of supplies. 42
The overall British Gulf coast campaign was clearly not the
sole invention of Admiral Alexander Cochrane, but was in fact
developed over a long period of time by several individuals. Probably the influence of Governor Cameron was as important in the
formulation of the plan as that of Admiral Cochrane. This fact
alone seems to set aside the opinion of the Duke of Wellington
and historian J. W. Fortescue that the whole idea of an attack
on New Orleans was conceived solely to obtain plunder for Cochrane and his friends. 43 Fortescue and Wellington were probably
overinfluenced in their judgment of the campaign by the tactical
blunder of the army at New Orleans which they blamed, perhaps
rightly so, on Cochrane. Cochrane was the senior British officer
at New Orleans, and he had already persuaded the army commander to land his troops below the city before the arrival of
Sir Edward Pakenham, the commanding general. Pakenham
41. Cochrane to Lambert, February 3, 1815, PRO: WO 1/143.
42. Manrique to Winchester, January 24, 1815, and C. Clark to Winchester, February 12, 1815, Winchester Papers; Winchester to
Jackson, February 16, 1815, Jackson Papers, Library of Congress.
4 3 . M a h o n , “British Command Decisions,” 65-67; J. W. Fortescue, A
History of the British Army, 13 vols. (London, 1899-1930), X, 15181.
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was reported to have been displeased with the position in which
he found the army, but the time had passed when changes could
be made.
That Pakenham was the Duke of Wellington’s brother-in-law
and close friend doubtlessly colored the Duke’s attitude toward
Cochrane; likely he considered him responsible for Pakenham’s
death. 44 To get to the heart of the problem, most of the senior
British commanders at New Orleans had been at the Battle of
Bladensburg and had complete contempt for American forces.
It is doubtful if Nicolls would have attacked Fort Bowyer with
only 252 men, including Indians, or that Pakenham would have
made a frontal assault on Jackson’s army if the British commanders had had due respect for American fighting ability. In
contrast, the second attack on Fort Bowyer at Mobile Point was
carefully executed and was completely successful.
The Gulf coast plan was fairly sound, and except for serious
British blunders, should have been successful. There were several
alternate ways of attacking New Orleans, each offering a better
chance of success than a foolish frontal assault on a well entrenched army. 45 The British made another mistake which affected the campaign, and this had to do with their dealings with
the Spanish. While Spain could not have provided Britain with
much military help in Florida, the bad judgment of the British
at Pensacola ended all cooperation in Florida between the two
countries. This break made it more difficult for the British to
supply their Indian allies, and it also encouraged people in West
Florida to provide even more intelligence information to the
Americans. The latter occurred with the tacit approval of the
Spanish officials. Also, the example of the bad treatment of the
supposed friends of the British at Pensacola was not lost on the
citizens of Louisiana, and it was likely one of their reasons for
not joining the British against the United States. Poor security
was another serious mistake the British made in their Gulf coast
campaign. The British collected their main force for the New
Orleans attack at Jamaica, where they hired boats and gathered
supplies from all over the Caribbean. Merchants, especially the
supposedly neutral ones at Pensacola, supplied Jackson with nu44. Mahon, “British Command Decisions,” 64-66.
4 5 . C o l e s , W a r o f 1 8 1 2 , 2 1 1 - 2 0 ; “Expedition against New Orleans,”
PRO:WO 1/142.
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merous accurate accounts of British activities. From the mass of
information available it was not difficult to determine the British
plan. 46 That the English intended to attack Mobile first was apparently known by Jackson, who seemed to have been equally
well informed of their change of plan. Jackson was waiting in
New Orleans with all the force he could muster to halt the British
attack. 47 It is fair to suppose that had it not been for the excellence of Jackson’s intelligence the British plan would have succeeded admirably at New Orleans, and then with the river open
to their navy, the area could have been held for as long as the
English wished.
46. Jane Lucas de Grummond, “Platter of Glory,” Louisiana History, III
(Fall 1962), 316-58; Jackson Papers, passim.
47. Historian Henry Adams, along with many of Jackson’s contemporaries,
believed that a British attack on Mobile was improbable. The British
records clearly show that the Mobile attack was seriously considered
and was not abandoned until around November 1814. Since this is
almost exactly the time that Jackson moved his headquarters to New
Orleans, it seems likely that there was a relationship. From the various
intelligence reports it is clear that he had access to the newspapers of
Cuba, Jamaica, and the entire Caribbean. He probably obtained much
more data and possibly positive oral information during his brief
occupation of Pensacola. See de Grummond, “Platter of Glory”;
Jackson to Blount, August 27, 1814, Augusta Chronicle, October 7,
1814; Henry Adams, History of the United States, 9 vols. (New
York, 1890), VIII, 330-32; Jackson to Monroe, December 13, 1814,
and Jackson to Monroe, February 10, 1815, in Letters of Secretary
of War; “A Report of a Spy in Pensacola,” copied by Colonel Robert
Butler, August 21, 1814, in miscellaneous files of secretary of war,
Letters of Secretary of War; Hawkins to Winchester, December 27,
1814, Winchester Papers; Hawkins to John Armstrong, June 15,
1814, American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive
of the Congress of the United States, Indian Affairs, 2 vols. (Washington, 1832), I, 859; Butler to Willie Blount, Jackson Papers,
Tennessee State Library, Nashville, Tennessee.
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